

## Message Text

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20

ORIGIN ACDA-10

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IO-10 L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01

SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 DODE-00

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DRAFTED BY ACDA/IR:TMCNAMARA

APPROVED BY ACDA/IR:AFLOYD

ACDA/IR:THIRSCHFELD

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R 310034Z MAY 75

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY BONN

USMISSION NATO

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T STATE 126897

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS:PARM, MBFR

SUBJECT:MBFR: FRG VIEWS ON VERIFICATION

REF: A. STATE 109061 B. BONN 8395

1. FRG EMBASSY MINISTER COUNSELOR SCHAUER ON MAY 30 GAVE US WRITTEN REPLY TO OUR VERIFICATION PAPER (REF A). HE CHARACTERIZED REPLY AS ELABORATION AND CLARIFICATION OF POINTS MADE ORALLY BY ROTH TO EMBASSY BONN (REF B). ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF GERMAN ORIGINAL AS GIVEN TO US BY SCHAUER FOLLOWS, FOR INFORMATION OF ADDRESSEES.

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2. BEGIN TEXT: CONCEPT OF NEGOTIATED INSPECTION FOR THE VERIFICATION OF A PHASE I AGREEMENT.

A. WE, TOO, CONSIDER THAT NON-INTERFERENCE WITH NATIONAL

TECHNICAL MEANS WILL CONTINUE TO BE AN ESSENTIAL PART OF ANY PROVISION FOR VERIFICATION.

B. WITHDRAWALS AND OTHER MOVEMENTS OF US AND SOVIET FORCES INTO AND OUT OF THE REDUCTION AREA SHOULD BE RESTRICTED TO CERTAIN DECLARED EXIT-ENTRY POINTS. IT SHOULD BE CONTRACTUALLY ARRANGED THAT MOVEMENTS OF US AND SOVIET FORCES INTO AND OUT OF THE REDUCTION AREA

WOULD ONLY BE ALLOWED THROUGH THESE EXIT-ENTRY POINTS. MOVEMENTS THROUGH OTHER THAN THESE POINTS WOULD BE ILLEGAL.

IN ADDITION, THERE SHOULD BE A PROVISION THAT MOVEMENTS TO BE CARRIED OUT THROUGH DECLARED EXIT-ENTRY POINTS SHOULD BE NOTIFIED IN ADVANCE TO THE OTHER SIDE.

C. AS EXIT-ENTRY POINTS ON THE WESTERN SIDE SOME MILITARY AIRPORTS AND HARBOURS (US BASES) COULD BE ENVISAGED. THE NUMBER OF 6 TO 8 POINTS, AS MENTIONED IN THE US PAPER, SEEMS TO BE WORTH CONSIDERING. AS IS ALSO POINTED OUT IN THE US PAPER, THE WESTERN EXIT-ENTRY POINTS MUST NOT BE LIMITED TO THE TERRITORY OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY. SUCH POINTS MUST SIMULTANEOUSLY BE PROVIDED FOR ON BENELUX TERRITORIES.

AS EXIT-ENTRY POINTS ON THE EASTERN SIDE SOME OF THE MAIN RAILWAY AND ROAD CROSSING-POINTS BETWEEN THE REDUCTION AREA AND THE SOVIET UNION AS WELL AS SOME AIRPORTS AND HARBOURS COULD BE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION. THERE COULD BE, ON THE EASTERN SIDE, SOME MORE POINTS THAN IN THE WEST.

D. EACH SIDE WOULD BE GIVEN THE RIGHT TO ESTABLISH INSPECTION POSTS AT THE DESIGNATED EXIT-ENTRY POINTS ON THE OTHER SIDE, IN ORDER TO OBSERVE THE  
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MOVEMENTS INTO AND OUT OF THE AREA, AS NOTIFIED IN ADVANCE, AND TO CHECK THAT NO OTHER MOVEMENTS THAN THOSE NOTIFIED ARE BEING CARRIED OUT, THROUGH EXIT-ENTRY POINTS.

THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INSPECTION POSTS WOULD BE RESTRICTED TO THE RESPECTIVE EXIT-ENTRY POINTS (RAILWAY AND ROAD CROSSING-POINTS, MILITARY AIRPORTS, MILITARY ZONES OF HARBOURS). NUMBER, STATUS, RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF INSPECTORS, AS WELL AS OTHER MODALITIES OF STATIONING THEM AT THE EXIT-ENTRY POINTS, SHOULD BE FIXED EXACTLY BY THE AGREEMENT.

THE INSPECTION POSTS WOULD BE ESTABLISHED FOR AN UNSPECIFIED TIME, DEPENDING ONLY ON HOW LONG THE FIRST-PHASE AGREEMENT WILL REMAIN IN FORCE. A SECOND-PHASE AGREEMENT COULD PROVIDE FOR SUPPLEMENTARY VERIFICATION ARRANGEMENTS.

E. THE INSPECTION POSTS AT DESIGNATED EXIT-ENTRY POINTS SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED IMMEDIATELY BEFORE WITHDRAWALS

ARE COMMENCED, IN ORDER TO MONITOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WITHDRAWALS AGREED UPON AS WELL AS OTHER TRANSFERS OF US AND SOVIET FORCES IN THE POST-REDUCTION PERIOD.

IN ADDITION, WE WOULD, UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS, BE PREPARED TO AGREE TO THE EXCHANGE OF OBSERVERS FOR THE PERIOD OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF WITHDRAWALS. THESE OBSERVERS COULD OBSERVE THE WITHDRAWALS BY ACCOMPANYING THE TROOPS TO BE WITHDRAWN FROM THEIR ORIGINAL LOCATIONS TO THE RESPECTIVE EXIT-ENTRY POINTS. THE ACTIVITIES OF THESE OBSERVERS WOULD BE STRICTLY CONFINED TO ACCOMPANYING THE WITHDRAWING TROOPS, AND WOULD END AS SOON AS THE WITHDRAWALS WOULD HAVE BEEN ACCOMPLISHED. THE OBSERVERS THEMSELVES WOULD, THEREFORE, LEAVE THE AREA IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WITHDRAWALS.

NUMERICALLY SPEAKING, THE IMPLEMENTATION OF WITHDRAWALS COULD BE COMPLETELY MONITORED BY INSPECTION POSTS AT  
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THE DESIGNATED EXIT-ENTRY POINTS, IN SO FAR, THE INSPECTION POSTS STATIONED AT THESE POINTS WOULD BE SUFFICIENT. BUT THERE MIGHT BE A CERTAIN INTEREST OF THE WEST TO ASCERTAIN THE IDENTITY OF THE WITHDRAWING SOVIET UNITS. IN ADDITION TO THE STATIONING OF INSPECTION POSTS AT EXIT-ENTRY POINTS, IT MIGHT THEREFORE BE USEFUL TO PROPOSE OBSERVERS AS MENTIONED ABOVE, WHO SHOULD ACCOMPANY THE WITHDRAWING FORCES AS LONG AS THE WITHDRAWALS ARE GOING ON. SUCH A PROPOSAL, HOWEVER, COULD ONLY BE MADE ON THE BASIS OF RECIPROCITY. WE WOULD PROBABLY, BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT ON OUR TERRITORY THIS KIND OF SUPERVISION WHICH, HOWEVER, SHOULD IN EVERY RESPECT BE STRICTLY CONFINED TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF WITHDRAWALS.

(HOWEVER, FROM THESE CONSIDERATIONS ON OBSERVERS FOR PHASE I VERIFICATION ONE SHOULD NOT CONCLUDE THAT THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY - IN A PHASE II (TWO) - WOULD BE PREPARED TO REDUCE BY UNITS ITS OWN FORCES).

F. THE VERIFICATION MEASURES TO BE DEFINITELY  
PROPOSED WILL DEPEND ESSENTIALLY ON THE NATURE AND  
EXTENT OF THE FORCE REDUCTIONS TO BE VERIFIED. A  
CONCRETE POSITION WILL THEREFORE NOT BE POSSIBLE  
UNTIL WE KNOW MORE ABOUT THE CONTENTS OF A FIRST-  
PHASE AGREEMENT. INGERSOLL

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